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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyses the role of the elderly couples’ past marital history in determining 
their current wealth holdings and portfolio allocation using data from the first wave of the 
Health and Retirement Study.  The results suggest that, for those who remarry after 
divorce, there is recovery from the negative shocks of marital breakdowns, which occur 
earlier in the life cycle.  While the net cost of divorce in terms of household wealth 
accumulation is higher for men than it is for women, in the “long run” it turns out to be 
statistically insignificant for both gender groups.  Therefore, the elderly couples’ marital 
history plays a minor role in explaining the dispersion in their wealth holdings near the 
end of the life cycle.  However, the results also show that both the probability of owning 
a particular asset and the fraction of net worth allocated to that asset might significantly 
vary depending on the elderly couples’ marital experience. Most importantly, the couples 
in which the spouses have divorced before invest relatively heavily on non-housing assets 
rather than owner occupied housing.  The further analysis of financial wealth only yields 
that the ownership and allocation of financial assets are not affected in a major significant 
way. 
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1. Introduction
In recent years, attention to issues such as the adequacy and variation of 
households’ retirement wealth has intensified given the public policy concerns created 
by an aging population. Wise D. and Venti S. (1998), and Lusardi A. (1999) note the 
existence of a large dispersion in savings among the U.S. households. Bernheim D., 
Skinner J., and Weinberg S. (2001) examine this variation within the context of 
standard life cycle models with rational, farsighted optimisation. They test for the 
presence of factors such as differences in rate of pure time preference, risk tolerance, 
exposure to uncertainty, health status, perceived life expectancy, lifetime earnings, 
and income replacement rates. 
 While examining these factors has its own merit, one would agree with the 
fact that there are many disruptions to households’ life cycles such as marital 
breakdowns and widowhoods, which may potentially hinder their ability to save for 
the retirement years.  In this paper, I examine the role of spouses’ marital history in 
terms of explaining differences in wealth holdings and portfolio allocation of older 
American couples by studying data drawn from the first wave of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS). 
 Over the last few decades, divorce has been a very common social 
phenomenon in the U.S.  Recently, the Census Bureau has reported that between 1970 
and 1996 the number of divorced people more than quadrupled and nearly half of 
recent first marriages are likely to end in divorce. Given its high frequency, 
economists have long realized the importance of understanding the consequences of 
divorce, especially for women and their custodial children.  However, a common 
practice in cross sectional studies of divorce has been to compare the well-being of 
currently divorced versus married individuals, or in dynamic studies to look at the 
divorced individuals’ relative well-being shortly after marital breakdown as compared 
to their prior divorce standard of living.  Although these studies have been useful in 
terms of understanding the “short run” effects of divorce, little is known about its 
“long run” influence over the life-cycle. The Census Bureau has also reported that 
most people who had ever divorced are currently married.  Therefore, simply 
comparing the standard of living between the currently divorced and married people 
will be misleading to examine the impact of divorce, since most of the currently 
married individuals have some marital disruption experience. 
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 HRS is an exceptionally rich data set, which collects detailed information on 
the entire marital history of both respondents and their spouses together with much 
other useful information on such as wealth, health and labour force status.  Since the 
sample coverage is mainly older individuals, examining the link between the elderly 
couples’ past marital experience and their wealth holdings, in this paper, sheds some 
light on the issue of “life cycle” or “long term” effects of divorce and widowhoods on 
the standard of living.  In this study, for example, it is possible to talk about answers 
to questions such as: To what extent do past marital disruptions to households’ life 
cycles play a role in creating wealth inequality among the elderly? Is there recovery 
from the negative shocks of divorce in the long run? If so, does the extent of recovery 
differ for men and women? Do the timings of marital disruptions matter? What 
happens to individuals who have multiple disruptions?  
 Of course, investigating the role of marital history in determining the levels of 
household wealth is of particular interest because of its policy implications. However, 
looking at the impact of marital disruptions on the way households allocate their 
accumulated saving across different assets, such as housing, IRA and Keogh accounts, 
and financial wealth, may also be helpful in expanding our understanding of the 
consequences of those marital breakdowns more generally. Understanding asset 
allocation is, for example, essential especially in developed countries such as the U.S. 
with prospective aging of populations because future economic security can depend as 
much on the way assets are invested as on the level of those assets. Asset allocation is 
also particularly important for understanding the behavior of individuals in the 
increasingly popular defined contribution pension plans that allow participants some 
discretion in their investment choices and for analyzing recent proposals for Social 
Security reform that call for mandatory saving accounts, with investment 
responsibility delegated to individuals. (Poterba J. and Samwick A. (1997)).  Thus, in 
the present study I also examine whether previous marital shocks of older couples 
significantly alter their both the probability of owning a particular asset and the 
fraction of net worth allocated to that asset over the life cycle. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly discusses the 
related literature.  In Section 3, I describe the data and provide some useful summary 
statistics. Section 4 explains the estimation issues and presents the basic results. 
Finally, in section 5 I conclude the paper. 
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2. Literature Review
 A great deal of previous work investigates different dimensions of economic 
outcomes driven by household dissolutions.  Most of the studies in this area, however, 
focus on the decline in economic well-being for women and their dependent children 
in the immediate postdivorce period and the concomitant contribution to the trend 
known as the feminization of poverty.  In these investigations, the main measure of 
standard of living is taken to be either household income or earnings, and surprisingly 
little work is done on the influence of divorce on consumption and wealth.  Moreover, 
I am unaware of any work, which directly looks at the impact of marital disruptions 
on portfolio allocation and investment decisions.   
 Although virtually all studies report a reduction in well-being for women and 
children after marital breakdowns (Holden K. C. and Smock P. J. (1991)), estimates 
for men are more variable.  Some studies such as Smock P. J. (1993, 1994) find that 
men experience a sizable improvement in standard of living after divorce, whereas 
others such as Peterson R. (1996) suggest that men’s well-being undergoes a modest, 
positive change. Still Burkhauser R. V., Duncan G. J., Hauser R., and Bernsten R. 
(1990, 1991), among others, estimate that both men and women suffer a decrease in 
standard of living, but women’s decline is far more serious than men’s. 
 The costs of marital disruptions might be particularly important when the 
adequate support of children is at issue.  Ideally, both parents would provide financial 
help for their children after divorce, even though Scoon-Rogers L. and Lester G. H. 
(1995) find that this often does not occur.  In the same line, Garfinkel I. (1992) 
provides evidence that nonresident parents often do not pay child support.  
McLanahan S. and Sandefur G. (1994) also show that loss of parental economic 
support is an important cause of the more negative outcomes for children in one-
parent families. 
 More recent work on economic consequences of divorce generally focuses on 
issues such as the increased labor force participation of women, the declining gender 
segregation of occupations, and the narrowing of the wage gap between men and 
women.  McKeever M. and Wolfinger N. (2001), and Page M. and Stevens A. H. 
(2004), for example, report that the losses suffered by recently divorced women and 
their children are substantially smaller and marital disruption now has much more 
modest economic consequences than in years gone by.  On the other hand, Bianchi S., 
Subaiya L., and Kahn J. (1999) provide mixed results with respect to whether an 
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economically independent wife is better able to achieve an equitable postseparation 
financial situation vis-à-vis her husband. 
 As mentioned before, the literature on divorce and its economic consequences 
is vast and it is not possible to talk about hundreds of other papers on the topic in a 
brief literature review.  However, I would stress here again that the previous work in 
this area mainly addresses the “short term” effects of marital disruptions by 
comparing the well-being of currently divorced versus married individuals in cross 
sectional studies or by looking at relative well-being shortly after marital breakdown 
in dynamic studies with generally short panels.  The novelty of the present paper, on 
the other hand, is that it focuses on wealth levels of older couples, which capture the 
accumulated influence of life cycle events, and sheds some light on the issue of “long 
term” effects of household dissolutions.  
 
3. Data Description
The data used in this paper are drawn from the first wave of the HRS. The 
HRS is a longitudinal national panel study of those near or in their retirement years. 
The first wave of the study was conducted in 1992 and it consists of interviews in 
approximately 7,600 households with a primary respondent aged from 51 to 61.  If an 
age-eligible respondent (an individual from the cohorts born between 1931-1941) had 
a spouse or partner co-residing then the spouse or partner was also given the same 
individual level interview separately even though he or she was not between the ages 
of 51 and 61.  However, in collecting household level information, which would be 
the same for both spouses, only one interview is given generally to the financially 
responsible member of the household.  In addition to a large number of usual 
demographic characteristics such as race, education and marital status, the survey 
collects detailed information on health and cognitive status, expectations, the nature of 
retirement decisions, housing, income and wealth holdings, work history, family 
composition, the availability of insurance and pensions.  Of particular interest for the 
present analysis is that the HRS provides detailed information on each respondent’s 
marital history. Therefore, I am able to use jointly the marital history information of 
both spouses to examine the effects of marital disruptions on older couples’ current 
wealth holdings and portfolio allocation. 
 Conducting an analysis of portfolio decisions requires that one specify the 
assets from which the investor chooses. In this paper, total wealth of each household 
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is the sum over net values of six asset types classified as owner occupied housing, real 
estate that is not primary residence, vehicles, businesses, IRA and Keogh accounts, 
and total financial wealth.  Of those 4744 couples in the HRS for whom I have 
complete information on the variables of interest, 4553 couples report positive levels 
of household net worth, while the other 191 couples have zero or negative levels of 
total household wealth.  When I further examine the allocation of financial portfolio 
separately, I divide the total financial assets into five different groups defined as i. 
stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts, ii. checking, savings, or money market 
accounts, iii. CDs, government saving bonds, and T-bills, iv. bonds and bond funds, 
and v. all other miscellaneous financial savings. 
 Table 1 presents the joint marital history distribution of the spouses in 4744 
HRS couples.  Three main variables by which I define marital history are the number 
of divorces, number of widowhoods and length of current marriage. Table 1.a first 
looks at the divorce experience of the elderly couples. Using the number of divorces 
of each spouse, I divide the sample into nine mutually exclusive couple types. (0,0), 
for example, denotes that both spouses in the couple have never experienced a 
divorce, and (1,0) means that the husband has gone through one divorce in the past 
and the wife has never been divorced. Given this definition, one can see from Table 
1.a that almost 34% of currently married couples (in which at least one of the spouses 
is from the cohorts born between 1931 and 1941) have experienced at least one 
marital breakdown in the past through either the husband or wife, while 66% of those 
couples had a stable marriage with no divorce history.  As one would agree, a 
significant number of the elderly couples have some divorce experience.  Thus, it 
would be of interest to examine how savings and portfolio decisions of the couples 
that have some marital disruption history differ from those of stably married couples 
without any household dissolution experience. 
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                           Table 1. Distribution of Marital History                                 
      
   a. Divorce   
      
   Wife's Number of Divorces 
    0 1            2+ 
 Husband's 0 0.664 0.062 0.008 
 Number of  1 0.089 0.101 0.019 
 Divorces                   2+ 0.014 0.027 0.016 
      
      
   b. Widowhood  
      
   Wife's Number of Widowhoods 
    0 1            2+ 
 Husband's 0 0.9250 0.0331 0.0015 
 Number of  1 0.0301 0.0091 0.0004 
 Widowhoods 2+ 0.0006 0.0002 0.0000 
      
      
   c. Length of Current Marriage 
      
        
  <=5 0.059   
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.056   
 Length >10 and <=15 0.059   
 (in years) >15 and <=20 0.069   
  >20 0.757   
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Not many respondents have ever been widowed when the first wave of the 
HRS was conducted in 1992.  Nevertheless, Table 1.b presents the joint widowhood 
history of the elderly couples to capture their entire marital history.  As in Table 1.a, 
Table 1.b shows the distribution of nine couple types defined using the information on 
the number of widowhoods of each spouse. That is, (0, 0) means that both spouses in 
the couple have never been widowed, and (1, 0) denotes that the husband has been 
widowed once and the wife has never experienced any widowhood.  As we see from 
the table, only 7.5% of the couples have experienced widowhood through either the 
husband or wife, because the sample elderly are relatively young when considering 
the average longevity of the U.S. population.  92.5% of older couples, on the other 
hand, have no widowhood history. 
 While looking at the distributions of number of divorces and widowhoods 
might capture most of the marital disruption history, one would argue that the timings 
of those marital shocks might also be particularly important in terms of understanding 
their long term effects over the life cycle. Therefore, in Table 1.c I present the 
distribution of couples conditional on the length of their current marriages. Using a 
five-year scale of marriage length, I group the couples into five different groups 
classified as the couples who have been married less than or equal to five years in 
their current marriage, more than five years but less than or equal to ten years and so 
on.  Table 1.c shows that 75.7% of older couples fall into the fifth group that have 
been married for at least twenty years. The rest of the couples are approximately 
evenly distributed among the other four groups.  I would stress here once more that, as 
in the case of divorce history, we observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the length of 
current marriages of older couples, which suggests that accounting for differences in 
their marital history might play a crucial role in terms of a better understanding of the 
dispersion in their wealth holdings and portfolio allocation. 
 Given the marital experience of older couples described in Table 1, I continue 
the descriptive analysis by exploring the relationship between their wealth holdings 
and marital history.1 Table 2 indicates the mean and median wealth levels of older 
couples conditional on the joint distribution of spouses’ number of divorces.  The raw 
statistics here apparently suggest the existence of a significant negative correlation 
                                                 
1 Even though I do control for spouses’ widowhood history later in the regression analysis, in this 
section I only present the descriptive statistics for their distribution of the number of divorces and the 
length of current marriages. 
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between wealth holdings and divorce history of the elderly couples. That is, the higher 
the number of divorces experienced, the lower the current net worth. This is true for 
both the mean and median wealth levels.  While the couples in which both spouses 
have never been divorced have on average $272,458 of net worth, the mean wealth of 
the couples in which both spouses have at least divorced twice is $139,130, which is 
only (approximately) 50% of $272,458.  The median wealth figures in percentage 
terms give us very similar results. 
 Considering the differences in household sizes, Table 3 reports the per capita 
household wealth levels of older couples conditional on their divorce history.  Again, 
we observe a significant negative correlation between both the mean and median per 
capita household wealth and the spouses’ number of divorces. In per capita terms, the 
couples in which both spouses have never been divorced achieve, on average, the 
highest level of net worth at $109,609.  On the other hand, the per capita wealth of the 
couples in which both spouses have at least divorced twice stays at $58,085. 
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Table 2. Levels of Total Household Wealth Conditional on Spouses' Divorce History 
           a. Mean Levels                     b. Median Levels  
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces  
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's    0 272458 213651 165570 Husband's 0 130000 86000 75458
Number of  1 185726 229275 99417  Number of  1 95000 104617 63000 
Divorces                   2+ 183735 157260 139130  Divorces                   2+ 74750 76500 62725 
      
      
           
           
           
           
Table 3. Levels of Per Capita Household Wealth Conditional on Spouses' Divorce History 
           a. Mean Levels                     b. Median Levels  
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces  
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's    0 109609 86344 70832 Husband's 0 47800 33433 35700
Number of  1 72400 95214 41746  Number of  1 34500 40938 25762 
Divorces                   2+ 79106 61258 58085  Divorces                   2+ 23617 28383 26667 
 Tables 4 and 5 show, respectively, the levels of total and per capita wealth of 
older couples conditional on the length of their current marriages. It is noticeable from 
Table 4 that the couples who have been married for at least fifteen years or more have 
significantly higher net worth than the rest of couples in both the mean and median 
terms.  For example, the mean net worth of the couples who have been married for 
more than twenty years is the highest at $263,380, and it is the second highest at  
$228,444 for the couples whose marriage length is more than fifteen years but less 
than or equal to twenty years. The other three marriage length groups defined on a 
five-year scale have approximately the same mean wealth levels in the range of 
$175,687-181,393.  Even though the difference in percentage points between the 
wealth levels of the lowest and highest ranked groups is not as strong as in the case of 
divorce history, it is 37%, which still suggests a significant positive correlation 
between net worth and the length of current marriage.  The median wealth levels are 
much lower than the mean levels for all groups. However, their orderings yields the 
same conclusions drawn from those of the mean wealth levels.  Moreover, Table 5 
indicates that accounting for differences in household sizes does not change the 
results much regarding the link between wealth holdings and the length of current 
marriages. 
 In the rest of this section, I present raw tabulations of the asset ownership and 
allocation profiles.  I first examine the six asset components of overall net worth 
categorized as owner occupied housing, real estate that is not the primary residence, 
vehicles, businesses, IRA and Keogh accounts, and total financial wealth.  I then 
extend the analysis to the components of financial assets to see if households with a 
greater degree of marital disruption experience systematically switch from risky to 
non-risky financial assets or vice versa. 
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Table 4. Levels of Total Household Wealth Conditional on Length of Current Marriage 
           
      Mean Median     
    <=5 181393 86235     
   Marriage >5   and <=10 175687 80500     
   Length >10 and <=15 177499 76525     
   (years) >15 and <=20 228414 97000     
    >20 263380 124450     
           
           
           
Table 5. Levels of Per Capita Household Wealth Conditional on Length of Current Marriage 
           
      Mean Median     
    <=5 74385 36195     
   Marriage >5   and <=10 76460 34500     
   Length >10 and <=15 65582 28483     
   (years) >15 and <=20 91051 34450     
    >20 106270 46000     
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 Table 6 presents the ownership probability of each component of total net 
worth conditional on divorce history.  The descriptive statistics in Table 6.a indicate 
that 88% of the couples in which both spouses have never been divorced are 
homeowners.  The homeownership rate of other couple types is systematically lower 
than 88% and takes a minimum value of 71% for the couples in which the husband 
and wife have been divorced twice and once, respectively.  Even though these are 
only raw statistics, which do not control for anything else, they suggest that the 
likelihood of current homeownership is monotonically decreasing with the number of 
spouses’ past marital disruptions.  When we look at Table 6.b, it is hard to draw any 
systematic conclusion regarding the effects of divorce history on the ownership 
probability of real estate that is not the primary residence.  Table 6.c, however, shows 
that even though most couples own at least one vehicle, the probability of vehicle 
ownership increases with the number of divorces, as opposed to homeownership 
probability.  The effects of divorce experience on business ownership seem to move 
in opposite directions for men and women. Table 6.d indicates that the ownership 
probability of business is likely to increase with the husband’s number of divorces and 
to decrease with the wife’s.  In case of IRA and Keogh Accounts ownership, Table 6.e 
suggests that the probability of owning those retirement accounts is significantly 
decreasing with the husband’s number of divorces but there is not a pattern on the 
effects of the wife’s marital disruption experience.  Finally, the statistics in Table 6.f 
do not yield a clear conclusion about the effects of marital disruptions on the 
ownership probability of financial wealth.  However, the regression analysis 
controlling for many other factors would provide a better picture in later sections of 
the paper in terms of understanding the relationship between marital history and the 
asset ownership and allocation profiles. 
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                                                    Table 6. Ownership Probability of Each Asset Conditional on Spouses' Divorce History 
           a. Owner Occupied Housing 
   
      b. Real Estate (not primary residence) 
   
 
     
        Wife's Number of Divorces Wife's Number of Divorces
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's     0 0.88 0.83 0.83 Husband's 0 0.28 0.28 0.23
Number of  1 0.84 0.84 0.77  Number of 1 0.24 0.28 0.24 
Divorces                   2+ 0.75 0.71 0.82  Divorces                   2+ 0.28 0.29 0.35 
           
         
        
           c. Vehicles 
 
       d. Businesses 
 
  
Wife's Number of Divorces Wife's Number of Divorces
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's     0 0.96 0.96 1.00 Husband's 0 0.17 0.11 0.08
Number of  1 0.96 0.97 0.98  Number of 1 0.14 0.18 0.12 
Divorces                   2+ 0.97 0.98 1.00  Divorces                   2+ 0.21 0.15 0.09 
           
       
        
           e. IRA, Keogh Accounts 
  
      f. Total Financial Wealth
  
  
Wife's Number of Divorces Wife's Number of Divorces
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's     0 0.48 0.43 0.33 Husband's 0 0.77 0.72 0.68
Number of  1 0.36 0.43 0.28  Number of 1 0.73 0.76 0.74 
Divorces                   2+ 0.31 0.32 0.39  Divorces                   2+ 0.76 0.73 0.68 
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 In Table 7, I examine the couples’ ownership probability of each component 
of total net worth conditional on the length of their current marriages.  The summary 
statistics in Table 7.a shows a significant positive correlation between the 
homeownership rate and the length of current marriage.  On the other hand, Table 7.b 
yields a negative relationship between the real estate ownership and the marriage 
length, while we do not observe a systematic link between the probability of owning 
vehicles and duration of current marriages in Table 7.c.  Even though the magnitude 
of the difference across household types is small, Table 7.d indicates that the 
probability of owning businesses increases with the duration of current marriage.  I 
cannot draw a decisive conclusion from Table 7.f for financial wealth, however, I am 
able to say from Table 7.e that the ownership of retirement accounts decreases with 
marriage length if I ignore the couples who have been married more than twenty 
years. 
 The next step is to examine how the shares of the six asset categories that 
comprise total net worth depend on marital history.  Table 8 reports the mean 
portfolio share of each asset type conditional on spouses’ number of divorces.  Since 
191 couples out of 4744 have zero or negative net worth, they are excluded from the 
sample when calculating the mean asset shares reported.  Similar to ownership 
profiles of housing, there is a negative relationship between the number of past 
divorces and the current share of owner occupied housing in total wealth.  This is true 
for both the husband’s and wife’s number of divorces.  While the couples in which 
both spouses have never been divorced invest on average 47% of their wealth into 
housing, this share is only 32% for those couples in which both spouses have at least 
two divorces.  There is an interesting pattern in the average shares of real estate. The 
husband’s number of divorces seems to increase the share of real estate, but that of the 
wife’s is not likely to affect significantly the fraction of net worth allocated to real 
estate.  The fraction of investment in vehicles is likely to increase significantly with 
both spouses’ number of divorces.  While the couples with no divorce experience 
invest on average 17% of their net worth on vehicles, the share of vehicles 
approximately doubles to 35% when both spouses have at least divorced twice.  There 
is not much variation in business share of total net worth conditional on spouses’ 
number of divorces, however the couples in which the wife has more divorces are 
likely  to  invest  less  of  their  net  worth  in  businesses.  The statistics for retirement 
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                Table 7. Ownership Probability of Each Asset Conditional on Length of Current Marriage 
        
           a. Owner Occupied Housing      b. Real Estate (not primary residence)  
              
        <=5 0.74 <=5 0.33
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.77   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.28  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.81   Length >10 and <=15 0.25  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.80   (years) >15 and <=20 0.25  
        >20 0.89 >20 0.28
          
           c. Vehicles       d. Businesses   
              
        <=5 0.96 <=5 0.14
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.94   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.14  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.96   Length >10 and <=15 0.13  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.95   (years) >15 and <=20 0.17  
        >20 0.96 >20 0.16
          
           e. IRA, Keogh Accounts      f. Total Financial Wealth  
              
        <=5 0.42 <=5 0.71
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.41   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.75  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.36   Length >10 and <=15 0.69  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.36   (years) >15 and <=20 0.72  
        >20 0.47 >20 0.77
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Table 8. Portfolio Share of Each Asset Conditional on Spouses' Divorce History 
          
      
 
           a. Owner Occupied Housing 
  
      b. Real Estate (not primary residence) 
   
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces 
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+
Husband's   0 0.47 0.51 0.45 Husband's 0 0.08 0.08 0.05
Number of  1 0.48 0.45 0.44  Number of 1 0.07 0.11 0.06
Divorces                   2+ 0.41 0.36 0.32  Divorces                   2+ 0.10 0.10 0.10
           
         
           c. Vehicles 
 
       d. Businesses 
 
  
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces 
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+
Husband's   0 0.17 0.22 0.25 Husband's 0 0.06 0.04 0.04
Number of  1 0.22 0.23 0.31  Number of 1 0.04 0.05 0.03
Divorces                   2+ 0.17 0.31 0.35  Divorces                   2+ 0.05 0.06 0.03
           
       
           e. IRA, Keogh Accounts 
  
      f. Total Financial Wealth 
  
 
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces 
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+
Husband's   0 0.09 0.08 0.05 Husband's 0 0.14 0.07 0.15
Number of  1 0.07 0.09 0.08  Number of 1 0.12 0.06 0.08
Divorces                   2+ 0.07 0.09 0.10  Divorces                   2+ 0.20 0.08 0.10
Note: These shares are calculated for 4553 couples who had a positive level of total wealth.       
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retirement account shares do not yield a clear conclusion regarding the effects of 
spouses’ divorce experience.  Finally, while the husband’s number of divorces has a 
positive effect on the share of financial wealth, the wife’s is likely to exert a negative 
influence. 
Now conditional on the elderly couples’ length of current marriages, Table 9 
presents the net worth shares of the same asset groups as in Table 8.  We observe a 
clear cut positive correlation between the share of housing and the duration of current 
marriage.  The couples who have been married for more than twenty years invest 48% 
of their wealth on average to owner occupied housing.  On the other hand, the couples 
that have been relatively newly married have only 36% of their net worth in this type 
of asset.  In contrast to housing, the average fraction of real estate is decreasing with 
the length of marriage, but the magnitude of the decrease does not seem to be 
significant. For relatively recent marriages, the share of vehicles constitutes a higher 
percentage of overall wealth, which is approximately 30%. However, this fraction 
reduces to 17% for older marriages that suggests the existence of a significant 
negative relationship between the marriage length and the vehicle share. The business 
shares, nonetheless, show an increasing pattern as the marriage duration gets longer.  
While the statistics for financial wealth shares are not very conclusive, the average 
retirement account shares support a negative correlation between the marriage length 
and the fraction of total wealth allocated to IRA, Keogh accounts. 
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Table 9. Portfolio Share of Each Asset Conditional on Length of Current Marriage 
         
    
 
           a. Owner Occupied Housing 
  
      b. Real Estate (not primary residence)
     
 
               
        <=5 0.36  <=5 0.11
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.40    Marriage >5   and <=10 0.12  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.47    Length >10 and <=15 0.09  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.45    (years) >15 and <=20 0.08  
        >20 0.48  >20 0.08
           
       
           c. Vehicles 
 
       d. Businesses 
   
  
               
        <=5 0.27  <=5 0.04
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.31    Marriage >5   and <=10 0.04  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.27    Length >10 and <=15 0.05  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.21    (years) >15 and <=20 0.07  
        >20 0.17  >20 0.06
           
           
           e. IRA, Keogh Accounts       f. Total Financial Wealth   
               
        <=5 0.10  <=5 0.13
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.11    Marriage >5   and <=10 0.03  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.08    Length >10 and <=15 0.04  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.07    (years) >15 and <=20 0.13  
        >20 0.09  >20 0.13
           
Note: These shares are calculated for 4553 couples who had a positive level of total wealth.       
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 Tables 10-13 focus on financial wealth only and repeat a similar analysis that 
is done in Tables 6-9 for the components of overall net worth.2  Conditional on 
couples’ divorce history, Table 10 looks at the ownership probability of each of five 
financial asset types described previously.  The statistics show that the ownership of 
stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts is less likely if spouses have some divorce 
experience.  Most of the couples have checking, savings and money market accounts 
and there is really not much variation in the ownership profiles of those accounts 
conditional on spouses’ divorce  history.  The ownership probability of CD, 
government saving bonds, and T-bills seems to be decreasing with the husband’s 
number of divorces and not affected by the wife’s number of marital breakdowns.  
Although not many couples own bonds and bond funds in general, both the husband’s 
and wife’s divorce experience are likely to exert a negative influence on their 
ownership probability.  Finally, we observe a clear cut positive relationship between 
the spouses’ number of divorces and the ownership of miscellaneous financial 
savings. 
Table 11 shows the ownership probability of each financial asset now 
conditioning on the length of couples’ current marriages.  The only monotonic 
relationship between the couples’ marriage duration and the ownership of financial 
assets appears for miscellaneous financial savings, even though its magnitude is small.  
For other forms of financial assets, however, we do not observe a systematic pattern 
in their ownership profiles conditional on the length of current marriages. 
 Tables 12-13 examine the allocation of financial assets conditional on 
spouses’ joint number of divorces and the length of current marriages, respectively.  
The effects of marital history on the fraction of financial wealth invested in each asset 
type generally go in the same direction as its effects on the ownership probability of 
the same financial asset.  The most noticeable effects of divorce appear to be on the 
share of stocks, mutual funds and investment trust, and the share of miscellaneous 
financial savings.  While the fraction of financial wealth invested in the former is 
likely to decrease with the spouses’ number of divorces, in the latter the effects 
reverse.  The allocation of financial assets, on the other hand, does not seem to vary 
significantly conditional on the length of spouses’ current marriages. 
                                                 
2 While the ownership probability calculations use the entire sample of 4744 older couples, the 
financial portfolio share analysis restricts the sample into 4187 couples who have positive levels of 
financial wealth. 
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Table 10. Ownership Probability of Each Financial Asset Conditional on Spouses' Divorce History 
           
           
           a. Stocks, Mutual Funds, and Investment Trusts     b. Checking, Savings, and Money Market Accounts 
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces 
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's    0 0.34 0.26 0.23 Husband's 0 0.86 0.83 0.85
Number of  1 0.31 0.31 0.29  Number of 1 0.85 0.89 0.82 
Divorces                   2+ 0.21 0.25 0.22  Divorces                   2+ 0.81 0.90 0.86 
           
           
          
       
           c. CD, Government Saving Bonds, and T-bills     d. Bonds, and Bond Funds  
 
Wife's Number of Divorces Wife's Number of Divorces
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+ 
Husband's    0 0.31 0.27 0.38 Husband's 0 0.08 0.07 0.03
Number of  1 0.25 0.27 0.24  Number of 1 0.06 0.06 0.01 
Divorces                   2+ 0.26 0.28 0.18  Divorces                   2+ 0.06 0.06 0.03 
           
           
           
         
           e. Miscellaneous Financial Savings       
Wife's Number of Divorces
   0 1            2+       
Husband's       0 0.17 0.17 0.15
Number of         1 0.15 0.18 0.29
Divorces                   2+ 0.22 0.17 0.27       
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Table 11. Ownership Probability of Each Financial Asset Conditional on Length of Current Marriage 
        
          
           a. Stocks, Mutual Funds, and Investment Trusts     b. Checking, Savings, and Money Market Accounts 
              
        <=5 0.32 <=5 0.87
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.29   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.87  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.26   Length >10 and <=15 0.81  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.28   (years) >15 and <=20 0.84  
        >20 0.33 >20 0.87
          
          
           c. CD, Government Saving Bonds, and T-bills     d. Bonds, and Bond Funds  
              
        <=5 0.26 <=5 0.06
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.27   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.04  
 Length >10 and <=15 0.25   Length >10 and <=15 0.05  
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.25   (years) >15 and <=20 0.07  
        >20 0.31 >20 0.07
          
          
           e. Miscellaneous Financial Savings      
            
         <=5 0.19
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.19       
 Length >10 and <=15 0.17       
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.17       
         >20 0.17
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Table 12. Financial Portfolio Share of Each Financial Asset Conditional on Spouses' Divorce History 
            
            
           a. Stocks, Mutual Funds, and Investment Trusts      b. Checking, Savings, and Money Market Accounts 
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces  
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+  
Husband's     0 0.18 0.17 0.05 Husband's 0 0.59 0.62 0.68
Number of  1 0.19 0.17 0.14  Number of 1 0.62 0.61 0.57  
Divorces                   2+ 0.11 0.14 0.10  Divorces                 2+ 0.62 0.66 0.66  
            
            
            
           c. CD, Government Saving Bonds, and T-bills      d. Bonds, and Bond Funds   
  Wife's Number of Divorces    Wife's Number of Divorces  
   0 1            2+     0 1            2+  
Husband's     0 0.12 0.10 0.15 Husband's 0 0.02 0.02 0.00
Number of  1 0.09 0.10 0.10  Number of 1 0.01 0.01 0.00  
Divorces                   2+ 0.08 0.08 0.08  Divorces                 2+ 0.03 0.01 0.01  
            
            
            
           e. Miscellaneous Financial Savings        
  Wife's Number of Divorces        
   0 1            2+        
Husband's         0 0.09 0.10 0.12
Number of  1 0.08 0.10 0.18  
Divorces               2+ 0.17 0.11 0.15        
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 Table 13. Financial Portfolio Share of Each Financial Asset Conditional on Length of Current Marriage 
          
          
           a. Stocks, Mutual Funds, and Investment Trusts    b. Checking, Savings, and Money Market Accounts 
 
               
         <=5 0.17 <=5 0.63
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.15   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.62   
 Length >10 and <=15 0.14   Length >10 and <=15 0.64   
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.17   (years) >15 and <=20 0.61   
         >20 0.18 >20 0.60
           
          
           c. CD, Government Saving Bonds, and T-bills    d. Bonds, and Bond Funds   
 
               
         <=5 0.08 <=5 0.02
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.10   Marriage >5   and <=10 0.01   
 Length >10 and <=15 0.09   Length >10 and <=15 0.01   
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.09   (years) >15 and <=20 0.02   
         >20 0.12 >20 0.02
           
           e. Miscellaneous Financial Savings       
             
          <=5 0.10
 Marriage >5   and <=10 0.11        
 Length >10 and <=15 0.12        
 (years) >15 and <=20 0.12        
          >20 0.09
           
Note: These shares are calculated for 4187 couples who had a positive level of financial wealth.    
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 Although the detailed descriptive analysis in this section provides us 
suggestive results in terms of understanding the role of spouses’ marital history in 
explaining the dispersion in wealth holdings and portfolio allocation of older couples, 
other demographics might be correlated both with divorce, and wealth holdings and 
portfolio decisions.  Therefore, I now turn to a multivariate approach that controls for 
other factors and helps us to disentangle the net effect of marital disruptions on net 
worth and asset allocation of the elderly couples.   
 
4. Estimation Issues and Results
 4.1. Wealth Levels 
In estimating the relationship between wealth levels and marital history of 
older couples, I use an OLS regression with the assumption that past marital 
disruptions are exogenous. One might argue that divorce is endogenous with respect 
to wealth levels.  Given the available data sets, however, it is a very difficult task to 
find instruments that are convincingly uncorrelated with wealth and highly correlated 
with divorce history.  The possible endogeneity here might be a serious problem, if 
there are many unobservable characteristics, which are correlated with both divorce 
history and wealth levels. With the rich data sets such as the HRS, it would be a less 
serious problem since they allow us to control for many demographic and economic 
variables that would be unobservable in other databases.  Given the importance of 
understanding the long term effects of marital disruptions and the public policy 
implications of those effects in an aging population, the approach taken here provides 
useful descriptive results.  
The estimation results for the wealth regression are reported in Table 14.  The 
dependent variable is the net value of  total household wealth measured in thousands 
of the U.S. dollars.3  The independent variables are classified into four groups as the 
husband’s characteristics, wife’s characteristics, variables that are common to both 
spouses, and marital history variables. 
 
                                                 
3  Because 191 couples out of 4744 report zero or negative levels of net worth, the dependent variable 
in the regression is chosen to be the levels of household wealth in thousands of the U.S. dollars rather 
than any other function of wealth. However, defining the logarithm of wealth for those households who 
report zero or negative net worth to be zero or excluding those 191 households from the sample and re-
estimating the regression where the dependent variable equals to the logarithm of household wealth do 
not change the main results presented in this paper.  
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Table 14: OLS Regression Results for Wealth Levels    
Dependent Variable is the Net Value of Total Household Wealth Measured in Thousands of US
Dollars         
         
        Estimated       
Explanatory Variable     Coefficient t-statistic     
         
Husband's Characteristics:       
Age    38.521  2.652   
Age Squared/100   -28.338  -2.311   
Years of Education   -21.686  -2.351   
Years of Education Squared/100  147.744  3.602   
Catholic    13.834  0.618   
Jewish    155.918  1.557   
Excellent Health   98.743  3.172   
Very Good Health   45.614  1.541   
Good Health   21.975  0.775   
Fair Health   23.029  0.767   
Covered by Health Insurance  -87.196  -3.650   
Least Risk Averse   -48.757  -2.361   
3rd Most Risk Averse   -63.669  -2.825   
2nd Most Risk Averse  -25.157  -1.526   
Expected Probability of Living upto 85 0.125  0.544   
Mental Health Score   -3.501  -0.544   
Ever Drink any Alcohol  13.890  0.900   
Smoke Ever   -86.677  -5.716   
Probability of Receiving Inheritance 0.734  3.121   
         
Wife's Characteristics:       
Age    11.330  0.880   
Age Squared/100   -8.074  -0.649   
Years of Education   -19.012  -1.653   
Years of Education Squared/100  143.459  2.896   
Catholic    -18.394  -0.842   
Jewish    118.911  1.141   
Excellent Health   82.052  2.391   
Very Good Health   75.078  2.282   
Good Health   29.140  0.911   
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Table 14 (Continued)       
Fair Health   20.616  0.619   
Covered by Health Insurance  -66.887  -3.028   
Least Risk Averse   42.452  1.995   
3rd Most Risk Averse   -9.256  -0.434   
2nd Most Risk Averse  3.397  0.191   
Expected Probability of Living upto 85 -0.224  -1.007   
Mental Health Score   -7.411  -1.475   
Ever Drink any Alcohol  50.810  3.358   
Smoke Ever   5.844  0.436   
Probability of Receiving Inheritance 1.034  4.495   
         
Common Variables:       
Number of Household Members  -6.031  -1.024   
Number of Living Children  -5.329  -1.510   
White    91.965  2.057   
Black    8.458  0.177   
Hispanic    2.020  0.040   
North East   -47.817  -2.029   
Midwest    -53.279  -2.498   
South    -76.867  -3.923   
         
Marital History Variables:       
Husband's Number of Divorces  -18.093  -1.377   
Wife's Number of Divorces  -5.010  -0.304   
Husband's Number of Widowhoods -3.347  -0.092   
Wife's Number of Widowhoods  19.920  0.597   
Couple's Length of Current Marriage 1.367  1.251   
         
Constant    -1335.360  -2.363   
Adjusted R-Squared   0.144     
Number of Observations  4744     
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The husband’s and wife’s characteristics are individual specific variables of 
each spouse, respectively.  Among those variables, consistent with the life cycle 
models of household savings and consumption, I include standard variables such as 
age, age squared, years of education, years of education squared, health status, 
ownership of health insurance. I also include some additional variables available only 
in the HRS such as expected probability of living up to 85 and receiving inheritance, 
mental health score, and risk aversion.4 Religion, smoking and drinking behavior 
variables are included in the regression with the idea that they might capture some of 
the unobservable life style effects, beyond health and risk aversion, which might 
possibly be correlated with both divorce and wealth.  
The common variables include the number of household members, number of 
living children, race and region.5  The number of living children is defined as the 
counts of different individuals who are either a child or a step-child of the respondent 
or spouse.  Since there are only a few couples in which the spouses have different 
races, the husband’s race is used as a common variable to proxy the impact of race on 
the couple’s wealth level.  The region variables are included in the regression, because 
there is a great degree of price variation across regions, which might affect the ability 
to accumulate wealth.6
Finally, as described in the data section in detail, marital history variables are 
the spouses’ number of divorces and widowhoods, and the length of their current 
marriages.  
Even though they are not the focus of the present paper, there are a few 
interesting results to notice from the Table 14.  First, most of the effects of the 
                                                 
4 Kezdi G. and Willis R. (2003) show that expectations are significant determinants of wealth holdings 
and portfolio allocation.  Therefore, those variables are also included in the regressions presented in 
this paper.  Information on inheritance expectations is drawn from the second wave of the HRS, 
because it has been collected beginning from that wave, and is unavailable in the first. In the HRS, each 
respondent is asked a question which involved four levels of risk taking behavior in terms of keeping 
the current family income safe. Depending on the answer the respondent’s risk aversion is classified as 
the least, 3rd most, 2nd most, and most.  Mental health score takes a value from 1 to 8 and measures the 
state of the respondent’s feelings.  The higher the score, the more unhappy and depressed the 
respondent. 
5A measure of permanent income, either at the individual or household level, would be appropriate to 
include in the regression. However, within the context of household dissolution, it is really not clear 
how to measure the permanent income in a sensible way.  Nevertheless, the inclusion of current 
nominal household income as an independent variable in addition to the variables in Table 14 only 
reduces the partial correlation of wealth and the spouses’ education, age and health status leaving the 
other results unaffected.   Moreover, even though possibly endogenous, controlling for the spouse’s 
current labor force participation also does not alter the substantive results of the present study.  
6 See Slesnick D. T. (2002) for evidence. 
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husband’s and wife characteristics are consistent with the previous literature, and go 
in similar directions and magnitudes except for those of smoking and drinking 
behavior. Second, from the common variable coefficients, we see that the couples 
with higher number of household members and living children have lower levels of 
net worth. However, the magnitudes of the effects for those variables are not 
statistically significant. Third, as expected, there are some significant differences in 
wealth holdings of older couples conditional on their race and region of residence. 
I now focus on the main variables of interest from the Table 14. The estimated 
coefficients indicate that the descriptive (seemingly significant) negative relationship 
observed between the spouses’ joint number of divorces and net worth, and the 
positive correlation between their length of current marriages and wealth disappear 
once we control for other factors in a multivariate regression.  As one can see from the 
Table 14, all of the coefficients estimated on marital history variables are statistically 
insignificant.  Consistent with some of the previous literature, if we assume that a 
marital breakdown is a negative shock to the life cycle then the results here suggest 
that, for those who remarry after divorce, there is recovery from the sufferings of 
marital disruptions, which occur earlier in the life cycle. While the net cost of divorce 
in terms of household wealth accumulation is higher for men than it is for women, in 
the “long run” it turns out to be statistically insignificant for both gender groups.  
Similarly, an insignificant positive coefficient on the couple’s length of current 
marriage shows that the timings of marital disruptions do not have a major influence 
on wealth levels of currently married older couples.  Thus, one can conclude that the 
elderly couples’ marital history plays a minor role in explaining the dispersion in their 
wealth holdings near the end of their life cycle. Having investigated the overall wealth 
levels, in the rest of this section I turn to the issue of portfolio allocation and marriage 
history. 
 
 4.2. Asset Ownership and Allocation: Components of Overall Net Worth 
 In examining the asset ownership and allocation profiles of older couples, I 
first consider the six components of overall net worth classified previously as owner 
occupied housing, real estate, vehicles, businesses, IRA and Keogh accounts, and total 
financial wealth.  My goal here is to determine whether previous marital shocks of 
older couples significantly alter their both the probability of owning a particular asset 
and the fraction of net worth allocated to that asset.  For the ownership probabilities, I 
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follow the general strategy employed in previous papers and estimate a probit model, 
including on the right hand side the marriage history variables and controls for total 
wealth, and other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. 
 Table 15 presents the marginal effects and t-statistics of marital history 
variables calculated from the probit estimation.  The results suggest that marital 
disruptions create important differences in asset ownership profiles of older couples 
especially for housing, vehicles, IRA and Keogh accounts, and total financial wealth.  
For home ownership, the couple’s length of current marriage turns out to be the most 
explanatory marriage history variable given the insignificant marginal effects for the 
husband’s and wife’s number of divorces and the wife’s number of widowhoods. The 
husband’s number of widowhoods, on the other hand, has a positive significant effect 
on housing tenure but remember that there are only a few husbands who have been 
widowed before.  Consistent with the descriptive statistics presented previously, 
marginal effects for vehicles show that the ownership of that asset increases 
significantly with both the husband’s and wife’s number of divorces.  Moreover, the 
results yield a significant positive correlation between the couple’s length of current 
marriage and vehicle ownership.  The effects of marital history on IRA and Keogh 
account ownership are particularly interesting.  While the wife’s number of divorces 
has no effect, that of the husband’s exerts a significant negative impact on the 
couple’s status on IRA and Keogh account ownership.  In case of widowhoods, 
however, the relationship reverses. That is, a couple is less likely to own IRA and 
Keogh accounts if the wife has a higher number of widowhoods and indifferent with 
respect to the husband’s.  The marginal effect of the length of current marriage on 
IRA and Keogh account ownership is negative and insignificant but almost 
significant.  Finally, the ownership of financial wealth, which is the most liquid form 
of assets, is also affected significantly by the spouses’ marital history. Even though 
marginal effects of the wife’s number of marital disruptions turn out to be 
insignificant, both the husband’s number of divorces and widowhoods increases the 
couple’s likelihood of owning positive amounts of financial wealth in their current 
portfolio set. Moreover, the results also indicate a significant positive relationship 
between the couple’s duration of current marriage and financial wealth ownership. 
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 Table 15: Probit Models for Ownership Probabilities            
Dependent Variable is the Dummy Indicator of Owning Particular Types of Assets 
                                  
                    
       
                 
Housing Real Estate Vehicles  Businesses IRA, Keog. Fin. Wealth 
Explanatory Variable   M.E. t M.E. t M.E. t  M.E. t M.E. t M.E. t 
                     
                    
                 
     
     
        
      
        
                    
                    
 
Marital History Variables:  
Husband's Number of Divorces -0.002 -0.156  0.005 0.331  0.015 2.448 0.015 1.278 -0.033 -2.121  0.023 1.906
Wife's Number of Divorces  0.006 0.512  0.016 1.055  0.014 1.919 -0.005 -0.432 0.003 0.212 0.006 0.489
Husband's Number of Widowhoods 0.053 1.981 0.035 1.037 0.009 0.713 -0.013 -0.451 -0.013 -0.364 0.036 1.783
Wife's Number of Widowhoods                          -0.008 -0.385  -0.010 -0.321 -0.006 -0.513 -0.009 -0.345 -0.055 -1.923 0.015 0.563
Couple's Length of Current Marriage 0.003 4.513 0.000 -0.048 0.002 2.643 0.001 1.424 -0.002 -1.624 0.002 2.422
 
                                      
 
Note: M.E. and t stand for marginal effect and t-statistic respectively.  The estimation also controls for other variables such as husband’s and wife’s characteristics, and common 
household variables including wealth.  The full set of results is available upon request. 
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 The next step is to estimate how the shares of the six asset types that comprise 
overall wealth of older couples depend on the spouses’ marital history.  As Rosen H. 
and Wu S. (2001) discuss in detail, investigators have previously used a variety of 
econometric approaches in estimating portfolio shares.  The main statistical issue 
arises from the fact that asset shares are bounded by zero and one.  While each 
approach has its advantages and disadvantages, following Poterba J. and Samwick  A. 
(1999), and Rosen H. and Wu S. (2001), I use a two-limit tobit procedure because it 
deals with issue of boundedness of portfolio shares by zero and one.7
 It is difficult to find a compelling reason to use a set of covariates different 
from that in the ownership equation, so following the usual practice, I use the same 
control variables as in the probit estimation.  The two-limit tobit estimates for the 
coefficients of marital history variables are presented in Table 16. The results show 
that marital breakdowns and timings of current marriages are significant determinants 
of older couples’ portfolio allocation. One can see from the table that while the share 
of owner occupied housing is increasing with the couple’s length of current marriage, 
it is decreasing with respect to both the husband’s and wife’s number of divorces.  
The magnitude of the estimated coefficients on marital history suggests that the 
couples in which the spouses have divorced before invest relatively heavily on non-
housing assets rather than owner occupied housing in their current marriage.  This 
could be due to either the couples who have been stably married without any marital 
breakdowns have over-invested in housing or the individuals whose marriages have 
been disrupted before have downsized their housing wealth when they remarried and 
invested relatively intensely on more liquid forms of non-housing assets.   In contrast 
to housing, for example, the share of overall net worth allocated to financial wealth is 
significantly increasing with respect to the husband’s number of divorces and 
widowhoods and decreasing with the length of current marriage. Similarly, the share 
of vehicles is significantly higher when the spouses have higher number of divorces 
experienced. Intuitively consistent, the wife’s number of divorces turns out to be 
unimportant in determining the business share of net worth, however, the husband’s 
divorces increase the fraction of wealth  allocated to that  type of  investment.  The 
                                                 
7 Ignoring the censoring issue and estimating a multi-equation system of asset shares also provide us 
very similar results regarding the effects of marital history variables on portfolio allocation of older 
couples. 
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Table 16: Two-Limit Tobit Regression Results of Portfolio Shares   
Dependent Variable is the Share of Total Wealth Held in a Particular Asset 
                                   
                    
       
                 
Housing Real Estate Vehicles  Businesses IRA, Keog. Fin. Wealth 
Explanatory Variable   Coef. t Coef. t         
                    
Coef. t  Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
 
                    
                 
       
        
       
   
      
                    
                        
 
Marital History Variables:  
Husband's Number of Divorces -0.057 -4.669 -0.001 -0.031 0.017 1.985  0.048 2.012 -0.003 -0.422 0.017 1.928
Wife's Number of Divorces -0.024 -1.903 0.015 0.648 0.026 3.801 -0.024 -0.753 0.006 0.903 -0.006 -0.573
Husband's Number of Widowhoods 0.009 0.322  0.021 0.445 -0.004 -0.259 -0.018 -0.232 -0.015 -0.981 0.035 2.381
Wife's Number of Widowhoods                   -0.020 -0.798  0.001 0.017  0.015 0.947  -0.038 -0.512  -0.018 -1.775 0.010 0.540
Couple's Length of Current Marriage 0.002 2.533 -0.001 -0.414 -0.001 -1.157 0.002 1.859  -0.001 -1.892  -0.001 -1.744
 
 
Note: Coef. and t stand for estimated coefficient and t-statistic respectively.   The estimation also controls for other variables such as husband’s and wife’s 
characteristics, and common household variables including wealth.  The full set of results is available upon request. 
 business share of net worth is also increasing with respect to the couple’s duration of 
current marriage.  Finally, the wife’s widowhoods have a negative impact on the share 
of IRA and Keogh accounts and the spouses that are relatively recently married invest 
less share of their net worth in retirement accounts. 
 
 4.3 Asset Ownership and Allocation: Components of Financial Wealth 
 In looking at the asset ownership and allocation profiles of older couples, I 
now go one step further and focus on the components of financial wealth only.  By 
dividing the total financial wealth into finer asset groups, the goal here is to see if 
households with a greater degree of marital disruption experience systematically 
invest more on the non-risky financial assets rather than the risky ones or vice versa.  
Similar to the analysis of overall net worth components, probit and two-limit tobit 
procedures are used, respectively, to investigate the effects of spouses’ marital history 
on the ownership and allocation of financial assets.  The results are presented in 
Tables 17-18.  While the probit estimation uses the entire sample of 4744 older 
couples, the two-limit tobit estimation restricts the sample into 4187 couples who 
have positive levels of financial assets.  
 Even though the spouses’ marital experience has a significant impact on the 
distribution of six types of net worth components at the aggregate level, the analysis 
of financial wealth only yields that the ownership and allocation of financial assets are 
not affected in a major important way by marital disruptions. The results in Tables 17-
18 show that marital breakdowns affect the distribution of financial assets mainly 
through the ownership and share of miscellaneous financial savings. Remember from 
the descriptive statistics that only approximately 20% of the older couples own some 
miscellaneous financial assets and the average share of miscellaneous assets among 
those who own positive levels of financial wealth is approximately 10%.  In both the 
probit and two-limit tobit results we observe a significant positive relationship 
between the ownership and share of miscellaneous financial savings, and the 
husband’s and wife’s number of divorces and the wife’s number of widowhoods. 
Moreover, the ownership and share of miscellaneous financial savings are increasing 
significantly with the couple’s length of current marriage.  Given these results, one 
can conclude that marital disruptions do not cause older couples to switch in a 
significantly planned way from risky to non-risky financial assets or vice versa. 
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Table 17: Probit Models for Ownership Probabilities of Financial Wealth Components 
Dependent Variable is the Dummy Indicator of Owning Particular Types of Financial Assets 
                               
                  
    Stocks & Mut. Bank Accts.  CD & T-bills  Bonds Miscellaneous 
                
Explanatory Variable   M.E. t M.E. t  M.E. t  M.E. t M.E. t 
                  
                 
              
   
     
      
     
                 
                 
 
Marital History Variables:  
Husband's Number of Divorces -0.009 -0.579  0.018 1.861 -0.008 -0.476 -0.006 -0.665 0.023 1.815 
Wife's Number of Divorces -0.019 -1.180 0.009 0.834 0.008 0.494 -0.014 -1.310 0.047 3.583 
Husband's Number of Widowhoods -0.019 -0.531 0.017 0.706 0.042 1.167 0.015 0.793 0.022 0.735
Wife's Number of Widowhoods                                -0.024 -0.729  0.002 0.093  0.015 0.435  0.005 0.274  0.047 1.709 
Couple's Length of Current Marriage -0.002 -1.482 0.001 1.630 0.000 0.340 0.000 -0.756 0.002 2.149 
 
                                  
 
Note: M.E. and t stand for marginal effect and t-statistic respectively.  The estimation also controls for other variables such as husband’s and wife’s characteristics, and 
common household variables including wealth.  The full set of results is available upon request. 
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Table 18: Two-Limit Tobit Regression Results of Financial Portfolio Shares 
Dependent Variable is the Share of Financial Wealth Held in a Particular Financial Asset 
                               
                  
    Stocks & Mut.  Bank Accts.  CD & T-bills  Bonds Miscellaneous 
                  
Explanatory Variable   Coef. t Coef.          
                 
t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
 
                 
              
    
     
   
   
     
                 
                 
 
Marital History Variables:  
Husband's Number of Divorces -0.005 -0.170  -0.001 -0.030 -0.034 -1.248 -0.003 -0.981 0.065 1.723 
Wife's Number of Divorces -0.060 -2.001 -0.032 -1.276 0.015 0.572 -0.004 -1.217 0.171 3.874 
Husband's Number of Widowhoods -0.023 -0.321  -0.045 -0.819  0.047 0.770 0.003 0.438 0.047 0.430
Wife's Number of Widowhoods                                -0.038 -0.536  -0.096 -1.868 0.044 0.794 0.003 0.437 0.203 2.061 
Couple's Length of Current Marriage -0.003 -1.424 -0.001 -0.816 0.000 0.251 0.000 -1.431 0.007 2.064 
 
                                  
 
Note: Coef. and t stand for estimated coefficient and t-statistic respectively.  The estimation also controls for other variables such as husband’s and wife’s 
characteristics, and common household variables including wealth.  The full set of results is available upon request. 
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 5. Conclusions
 This paper investigates the role of spouses’ marital history in terms of 
explaining differences in wealth holdings and portfolio allocation of older couples by 
studying data drawn from the first wave of the HRS.  The results of the empirical 
analysis lead to the following conclusions.  While the net cost of divorce in terms of 
household wealth accumulation is higher for men than it is for women, in the “long 
run” it turns out to be statistically insignificant for both gender groups. Remember 
that, this only applies to the currently married individuals.  Therefore, it suggests that, 
for those who remarry after divorce, there is recovery from the negative shock of 
marital breakdowns, which occur earlier in the life-cycle.  Thus, the elderly couples’ 
marital history plays a minor role in explaining the dispersion in their wealth holdings 
near the end of the life cycle.   
The examination of the asset components of net worth, however, indicates that 
both the probability of owning a particular asset and the fraction of wealth allocated to 
that asset might significantly vary depending on the elderly couples’ marital history. 
Most importantly, the couples in which the spouses have some divorce experience 
invest relatively heavily on non-housing assets rather than owner occupied housing.  
This can be interpreted as either the couples who have been stably married without 
any marital disruptions have over-invested in housing or the individuals whose 
marriages have been dissolved before have downsized their housing wealth when they 
remarried and invested relatively intensely on more liquid forms of non-housing 
assets.   
Finally, the separate analysis of financial wealth shows that marital disruptions 
do not have a major significant impact on the ownership and allocation profiles of 
financial assets among the older couples.  Therefore, we do not find any evidence 
supporting that households with a greater degree of marital disruption experience 
systematically invest more on the non-risky financial assets rather than the risky ones 
or vice versa.  Findings of an insignificant effect on financial asset distribution and a 
significant impact on overall net worth allocation of marital disruptions suggest that 
liquidity of assets is more important than the risk factor in portfolio decisions of 
previously divorced individuals. 
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